Budget Balance within the Constitutional Framework of the Member States of the European Union

Abstract

The constitutional regulation of the budgetary balance requirements, from the lack of numerical fiscal rules to the institutional constraints regarding the rationalization of decision-making processes and budgetary procedures within the European Union, varies in different member states. It depends on the economic situation and the economic context both nationally and internationally. Classical constitutionalism aims at the established limits of political power through the supreme norms of the constitution, it becomes insufficient for the establishment of legal norms to limit economic excesses. The constitutional norms set further limits, a fact that sets limits to the budget decision-making process and public spending. The economic requirement of the budget balance is taken over at the constitutional level in the EU member states, it is applied through the internal legal regulation based on the constitutional norms according to the European legislation. In the perspective of the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, the legislation of the Union cannot be implemented immediately in the national constitutional framework, especially the budgetary one. The European regulatory package required member states to form institutions modelled after the Fiscal Council in Germany, specialized in formulating macroeconomic forecasts and monitoring compliance with the budget balance established by the European Union, coordinated by the European Fiscal Board, mandated to independently evaluate the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. DOI: https://doi.org/10.53486/cike2023.66; UDC: 336.143.21:061.1EU; JEL: K10, K15, K23, K33, O52